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1 Introduction
With regard to the unemployment problem, macroeconomists and labor economists seem
to have reached a consensus, suggesting that any explanation of the divergent unem-
ployment experiences in OECD countries must take account of the interaction of shocks
and labor market institutions.1 This paper contributes to the analysis of shocks and
institutions by focusing on the unemployment and real wage consequences of different
unemployment compensation systems in open economies.
Whereas most of the literature has drawn attention to the impact of the benefit level,
the structure of the unemployment compensation system may be as or even more im-
portant (cf. Manning, 1998). In most OECD countries a two-tier unemployment com-
pensation system exists which comprises earnings-related unemployment insurance and
flat-rate unemployment assistance. However, the share of earnings-related benefits in to-
tal unemployment compensation significantly varies between countries. Germany and the
UK can be interpreted as limiting cases since in Germany both unemployment insurance
and unemployment assistance are earnings-related, whereas in the UK both are paid as
flat-rate transfers.2
In this paper it is analyzed how the benefit system determines the reaction of real
wages and unemployment to labor market shocks originating from abroad. The focus on
labor market shocks is not arbitrary. For instance, in the European Union fiscal policy has
to obey the strict limits on borrowing laid down in the Stability Pact, and monetary policy
is primarily concerned about inflation. In such an economic environment the relative per-
formance of economies largely depends on the labor market. However, in open economies
labor market shocks in one country will also have an impact on other countries. The
shocks considered in our analysis are changes in labor unions’ relative bargaining power
and/or union preferences, or changes in the generosity of the unemployment compensa-
tion system. It will be shown that the impact of labor market shocks on other countries
1See, for instance, Layard et al. (1991), Nickell (1997), Ljungquist and Sargent (1998), Nickell and
Layard (1999) and Blanchard and Wolfers (2000).
2The institutional details of unemployment compensation systems are, for instance, described in OECD
(1999) and Beissinger (2002), chap. 2.
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depends on the unemployment compensation systems in those countries. As an important
and novel feature of the analysis it is also demonstrated how idiosyncratic labor market
shocks influence the wage bargaining process in open economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 the analysis is related
to previous contributions in the literature. Section 3 introduces the two-country model
characterized by monopolistic competition in goods markets and wage bargaining in labor
markets. In Section 4 the impact of the benefit system on international spillover effects is
considered. The analysis distinguishes between two-tier, pure earnings-related and pure
flat-rate benefit systems. Section 5 provides a summary and some conclusions.
2 Relation to the Literature
In reaction to Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) who criticized theoretical studies which
largely ignored real-world differences in unemployment compensation systems, numerous
theoretical and empirical contributions emerged analyzing the impact of benefit systems
on the employment performance of an economy.3 One branch of this literature focuses
on the consequences of earnings-related versus flat-rate benefit systems. For example,
Schluter (1997) considers the relative performance of earnings-related and flat-rate ben-
efits with respect to the alleviation of poverty and the reduction of income inequality.
Pissarides (1998) demonstrates that the type of unemployment compensation system may
play a crucial role in determining the employment effects of tax-rate changes. Egger (2002)
compares the consequences of earnings-related and flat-rate benefit systems in right-to-
manage and efficient bargaining models. Goerke (2000), Heer and Morgenstern (2000)
and Goerke and Madsen (2002) analyze the employment and real wage effects which re-
sult if the share of earnings-related unemployment benefits relative to flat-rate transfers
is increased, and Bra¨uninger (2000) establishes a link between the type of unemployment
compensation system and the employment performance of different skill groups. With
the exception of the latter author, who presents a model of a small open economy, the
above cited contributions exclusively concentrate on closed-economy models.
3See, for instance, Holmlund (1998) for a review of the literature.
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In contrast to this literature, our former paper, Beissinger and Bu¨sse (2001), compares
pure earnings-related and flat-rate unemployment compensation systems within a two-
country framework. It is demonstrated that a pure earnings-related benefit system partly
neutralizes the effects of labor market shocks stemming from abroad since only real wages
but not employment are affected. This is in contrast to a flat-rate system in which both
unemployment and real wages are influenced by international shock spillovers. Opposite
results are obtained for the country where the shock originates. In that country the
change in employment is more pronounced if an earnings-related instead of a flat-rate
system prevails.
The impact of idiosyncratic labor market shocks on other countries seems to be the
implication of a crucial assumption made in Beissinger and Bu¨sse (2001) stating that firms
use a Cobb-Douglas technology. In an earnings-related system this assumption leads to
a vertical wage-setting curve in real wage/unemployment space, whereas in a flat-rate
system the wage-setting curve is downward-sloping . Moreover, in a Cobb-Douglas model
international shock spillovers only affect labor demand, whereas the wage bargaining
process remains unaffected. Since shock spillovers lead to a shift of the labor demand
curve but leave the wage-setting curve unchanged, it seems to be immediately obvious
that employment will not change in a benefit system with a vertical (as opposed to a
downward-sloping) wage-setting curve.
One aim of our new paper is to scrutinize whether the results of Beissinger and Bu¨sse
(2001) are robust to a change in the production function assumed. A natural generaliza-
tion is to use a CES production technology which implies that the wage-setting curve is
downward-sloping in both earnings-related and flat-rate benefit systems. Moreover, we
will consider the implications of two-tier benefit systems which have not explicitly been
analyzed in our former paper. As a consequence of our generalization it will turn out that
not only labor demand but also the wage bargaining process is affected by international
shock spillovers. In our view, this aspect of our analysis is of broader interest in its own
right. As far as we know, the impact of international spillover effects on the location of the
labor demand and wage-setting curve has not yet been analyzed in the literature. We will
show how the extent of the shift of both curves depends on the respective unemployment
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compensation system, which enables us to provide a graphical exposition of our analytical
results.
3 The Model
In the two-country model developed in this paper the goods market is integrated and
characterized by monopolistic competition between firms. It is assumed that all goods
are tradable, i.e. the nontraded goods sector is neglected. On the labor market wage
bargaining takes place at the firm level. The outcome of the wage-setting process is
influenced by the relative bargaining power of firms and unions, the preferences of labor
unions for employment and wages and the institutional setup of the social security system.
It is assumed that countries are different with respect to these variables, but are identical
otherwise. The differences in wage setting may lead to country-specific wage and price
levels which can persist since migration of the labor force is impeded by cultural and
linguistic barriers. Besides the number of households also the number of firms in both
countries is exogenously given, which may be due to barriers to market entry provoked
by sunk costs. For the ease of exposition it is assumed that unemployment benefits are
financed by (lump-sum) taxes on the fixed stock of capital. In this case the government
budget constraint and the impact of taxes on the wage-setting process do not have to
be taken into account. In our former paper, Beissinger and Bu¨sse (2001), we already
demonstrated that the qualitative results are not changed if unemployment benefits are
instead financed by a proportional tax on wage income.
The assumption of international heterogeneity of labor market institutions captures
important facets of real world economic systems. To take some examples, the theoretical
framework can, in principle, be interpreted as describing the interdependencies between
member states of the European Union, or between the European Union on the one hand,
and the United States on the other. There may be some doubt about whether a theoretical
framework based on firm-level wage bargains can produce meaningful results for European
economies in which wage bargains often take place at the industry or national level. The
well-known hypothesis of Calmfors and Driffill (1988) suggests that there might be a U-
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shaped relationship between the levels of bargained wages and employment on the one
hand and the degree of centralization of wage bargaining on the other. Though being
restricted to firm-level wage bargains, the following analysis is also relevant for European
economies for basically two reasons: First, the focus is not on the explanation of country-
specific levels of unemployment and real wages, but on the changes of these variables which
are provoked by international spillover effects. Second, the Calmfors-Driffill hypothesis
has been formulated for a closed economy. However, as argued by Danthine and Hunt
(1994) and Flanagan (1999), in a model of an open economy with integrated goods markets
economic performance becomes more or less independent of bargaining structure.
3.1 Demand for Labor in Each Country
In both countries A and B there is a exogenously given number of G/2 single-product firms
and L consumers/workers. With respect to consumer preferences we make the following
Assumption 1 Consumer preferences are identical and comprise all goods Yij of the two-
country world, i = 1 . . . G/2, j = A,B. Preferences are described by a CES utility function
of the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) type with η being the constant elasticity of substitution
between all goods, 1 < η <∞.
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor which is supplied inelastically. Since
migration is excluded, labor can only be supplied in the respective home country. Customs
duties, value added taxes and transportation costs are neglected in the model. This
implies that the price Pij for a specific good is the same for consumers and producers of
either country. Taking account of the budget constraint, utility maximization leads to the
goods demand functions of each consumer. In order to obtain the goods demand function
relevant for the single firm, one has to sum up the demand functions for the respective
good across all consumers of both countries.
Lemma 1 Producer of good i in country j = A,B faces the goods demand function
Y dij = (Pij/P )
−η (Y/G), i = 1, . . . , G/2, where Y is world real income and P denotes the
aggregate price index whose definition corresponds to the CES utility function.
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Proof. See Appendix. ¤
According to Lemma 1, the firm’s goods demand function is a negative function of its
price (relative to the prices of other firms) and a positive function of world real income. If
all firms in the two-country world chose the same price, each firm would obtain the same
share of world demand (or equivalently, world real income). The elasticity of the demand
for goods is constant and equals η (in absolute values). Of course, in general equilibrium
world real income Y is itself an endogenous variable, but from the firm’s point of view it
is taken as exogenous since it is assumed that the number of firms is large. With respect
to technology we make
Assumption 2 Technology of firm i in country j is described by a linear-homogeneous
CES production function of the form
Yij =
[
aNβij + (1− a)Kβij
] 1
β
, −∞ < β < 1, β 6= 0, i = 1, . . . , G
2
, j = A,B,
where Nij is employment, Kij is the (exogenously given) capital stock, and a is the distri-
bution parameter of the CES production function, with 0 < a < 1.
This technology implies a constant elasticity of substitution between capital and labor
of σ = 1/(1 − β). As will be shown below, the real wage of firm i in country j (in
terms of the aggregate good), wij, is determined in a wage bargain between each firm
and the corresponding labor union. With the wage already determined, firms chose the
employment level which maximizes profits, leading to
Lemma 2 With monopolistic competition in the goods market the labor demand function
Nij = N
ij(wij, Y ) of firm i in country j is a negative function of its real wage and a
positive function of world real income.4
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
It is assumed that all firms and labor unions of a country are identical. All firms of a
country therefore face the same country-specific wage rate wj. It follows that the national
4Since Kij and G are considered to be fixed, they are not taken into account in the labor demand
function N ij(·).
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levels of employment and the stock of capital are given by Nj = (G/2)Nij and Kj =
(G/2)Kij. With an exogenously given workforce L in each country, employment Nj and
the unemployment rate uj are negatively related via Nj = (1− uj)L. The labor demand
function of each country can therefore also be expressed in terms of the unemployment
rate:
Lemma 3 The inverse labor demand function of country j = A,B, wj = n
j(uj, Y ),
is a positive function of both the country-specific unemployment rate uj and world real
income Y .
Proof. See Appendix ¤
The fact that labor demand is a function of world real income is of uttermost importance
for the results of this paper. All other things being constant, an increase in aggregate
income Y leads to a rise in the firm’s relative price pij ≡ Pij/P and thereby to a rise
of marginal revenue. As a consequence, firms increase labor demand which reduces the
marginal product and pij until the first order condition for a profit maximum is restored.
As will be shown in more detail below, world real income depends on the production
levels (and therefore on the factor inputs) of both countries. As a result, labor demand
in one country also depends on labor demand in the other country. In the following the
impact of aggregate income on marginal revenue and hence labor demand will be called
the aggregate income effect.
3.2 Wage Setting in Each Country
In both countries wage bargaining takes place at the firm level. It is assumed that labor
unions’ preferences can be described by the following utility function.
Assumption 3 The utility function Jij of labor union i in country j is given by
Jij = N
φj
ij [wij − zj] , φj > 0, i = 1, . . . ,
G
2
, j = A,B,
where φj represents labor unions’ preferences for employment relative to wages, and zj
denotes the expected real income of a worker who loses his job in the firm under consid-
eration.
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The parameter φj is introduced to explicitly take account of changes in labor union’s
wage bargaining policy caused by a change in preferences.5 It was already pointed out
that unemployment benefits are financed by taxes levied on the fixed stock of capital.
Since payroll taxes and taxes on wage income are neglected, the real wage wij is the
same for employers and employees. It is determined in an asymmetric Nash bargain in
which χj determines the bargaining power of labor unions in country j, 0 < χj < 1. In
the following, we will restrict the analysis to the case where the elasticity of substitution
between capital and labor, σ, is less than one.6 The bargaining result is summarized in
Lemma 4 It is assumed that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is
less than one. The real wage determined in the firm-level Nash bargain then is set as
markup mij on the expected alternative income zj according to
wij = mij zj, mij = m
ij(wij, Y, φj, χj) ≡ µij
µij − 1 ,
with µij = µ
ij(wij, Y, φj, χj) ≡ φjεNWij (N ij(wij, Y ))+
1− χj
χj
κεYNij (N
ij(wij, Y ))
1− κεYNij (N ij(wij, Y ))
, where
εNWij denotes the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the real wage (in absolute
values) and εYNij is the elasticity of output with respect to employment.
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Proof. See Appendix. ¤
The fact that the wage markup is a function of the real wage and world real income
complicates the analysis for basically two reasons. First, the dependence of mij on wij
implies that an explicit solution for the firm’s real wage cannot be derived. And second,
the dependence of mij on Y implies that the bargained real wage in each country is a
function of world real income and therefore of the employment level in the other country.
5For similar specifications of labor unions’ preferences see, for example, Abowd and Lemieux (1993)
and Nickell (1999) for φ = 1, and Manning (1991, 1993) allowing for φ 6= 1.
6This assumption guarantees that the maximum of the Nash product is found by the corresponding
first-order condition. An elasticity σ < 1 also leads to a downward-sloping wage-setting curve in real
wage-unemployment space. It must be stressed that the assumption σ < 1 is not very restrictive since
there is compelling empirical evidence that the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital is
lower than one, cf. Hamermesh (1993), chap. 3, and Chung (1994).
7It must hold that µij > 1 in order to guarantee that wij > 0.
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In other words: the aggregate income effect not only works via the labor demand equation,
but also via the wage-setting equation.
Lemma 5 With σ < 1, the partial derivatives of the wage-markup function have the
following signs: mijwij < 0,m
ij
Y > 0,m
ij
φj
< 0 and mijχj > 0.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
According to Lemma 5, an increase in world real income leads to an increase of the wage
markup. The reason for this important result is evident from the proof of Lemma 5 in
the Appendix. On the one hand, a higher Y leads to a lower labor demand elasticity
which cet. par. increases wage pressure. On the other hand a higher Y also reduces the
elasticity of the firm’s profits with respect to the wage which reduces the firm’s position
in the Nash bargain. The latter effect is an additional reason for higher wage pressure.
For the derivation of the aggregate wage-setting curve one must take the definition
of zj into account. It is assumed that
zj =
(
1− θj(uj)
)
wj + θ
j(uj)sj, 0 < θ
j < 1, θjuj > 0, j = A,B. (1)
The function θj denotes the probability of finding a job elsewhere in that country, which
depends on the respective unemployment rate uj.
8 The variable wj is the average real
wage level (in terms of the aggregate good) and sj is the real unemployment compensation
in country j, defined as
sj = γjρjwj + (1− γj)bj = ρ˜jwj + b˜j, 0 ≤ γj ≤ 1, 0 < ρj < 1, bj > 0, (2)
where γj denotes the share of earnings-related benefits in total unemployment compen-
sation. The parameter ρj reflects the ratio of benefits to wages in the earnings-related
component, bj denotes flat-rate benefits, ρ˜j ≡ γj ρj and b˜j ≡ (1− γj) bj.9 In the case of a
8In the literature sometimes the special case θj = uj is considered. However, it follows from an
intertemporal bargaining framework that the correct specification is based on the more general function
θj which, besides unemployment, would also depend on parameters such as the discount rate and the
entry rate into unemployment. For details see, for instance, Layard and Nickell (1990) and Beissinger
and Egger (2001).
9In accordance with the literature it is assumed that earnings-related benefits are a function of the
average wage level in the respective country. This guarantees that zj is exogenous in the firm-level
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pure earnings-related unemployment compensation system, γj = 1, which implies b˜j = 0.
If benefits are paid as flat-rate transfers, γj = 0, which leads to ρ˜j = 0. In the following,
we will first assume that a two-tier unemployment compensation system prevails in both
countries, which implies ρ˜j > 0 and b˜j > 0 for j = A,B. At a later stage of the analysis,
we will consider the special cases where either a pure earnings-related or pure flat-rate
system prevails in both countries. Since within a country all firms and unions are identi-
cal, wij = wj must hold in equilibrium. The aggregate wage-setting equation can then be
characterized by
Lemma 6 The wage-setting equation is a function wj = w
j(uj, Y, φj, χj, ρ˜j, b˜j), with
wjuj < 0, w
j
Y > 0 w
j
φj
< 0, wjχj > 0, w
j
ρ˜j
> 0, wj
b˜j
> 0, j = A,B.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
3.3 Aggregate Output and its Impact on Labor Demand and
Wage Setting
To close the model, aggregate output is written as a function of the national production
levels, which in turn depend on factor inputs. This leads to
Lemma 7 Aggregate output is a function of national unemployment rates, defined by
Y = y(uA, uB) with yuj < 0, j = A,B.
Proof. See Appendix ¤
The dependence of aggregate output on the unemployment rates of both countries has
to be taken into account in the aggregate labor demand function and in the wage-setting
equation of each country.
bargain. In some countries there is a ceiling on unemployment insurance below or near average earnings
which corresponds to the theoretical assumption, see Beissinger (2002), chap. 2. Beissinger and Egger
(2001) discuss within a dynamic wage bargaining model the complications which arise if this assumption
is abandoned.
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Proposition 1 (Aggregate Labor Demand Curve in Each Country)
The aggregate labor demand curve is described by wj = n
j(uj, y(uA, uB)), for j = A,B.
The curve is upward-sloping in real wage-unemployment space. An increase in the unem-
ployment rate abroad shifts the labor demand curve in the country under consideration
downwards and vice versa.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
The properties of the wage-setting curve are summarized in
Proposition 2 (Aggregate Wage-Setting Curve in Each Country)
The aggregate wage-setting curve is wj = w
j(uj, y(uA, uB), ρ˜j, φj, χj, b˜j), for j = A,B.
This curve is downward-sloping in real wage-unemployment space. An increase in the
unemployment rate abroad shifts the wage-setting curve in the country under considera-
tion downwards and vice versa. The signs of the remaining partial derivatives follow from
Lemma 6.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
Note that the effect of a change in the “own” unemployment rate on aggregate income
has an influence on the slope of the labor demand curve and wage setting curve, whereas
a change in the unemployment rate abroad leads to a shift of both curves.
4 The Effects of Country-Specific Labor Market
Shocks
The labor market equilibrium in each country is characterized by the intersection of the
respective aggregate labor demand curve and wage-setting curve. The comparative-static
analysis is therefore based on the two-equation system
nj(uj, y(uA, uB))− wj(uj, y(uA, uB), ρ˜j, φj, χj, b˜j) = 0, j = A,B, (3)
for the two unknowns uA and uB. Inserting the solution for the unemployment rates in the
labor demand equation (or wage-setting equation) of each country leads to the solution
for real wages, wA and wB. For the comparative-static analysis we make the following
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Assumption 4 In Country A an (adverse or favorable) labor market shock occurs, i.e.
the variable xA changes, where xA ∈ XA = {φA, χA, ρ˜A, b˜A}. The respective variables for
country B remain unchanged.
4.1 Two-Tier Unemployment Compensation System
It is first assumed that ρ˜ > 0 and b˜j > 0 for j = A,B, i.e. a two-tier unemployment
compensation system prevails in both countries. For the comparative-static effects in
country B the following result is important:
Proposition 3 (Aggregate Income Effect in Two-Tier Benefit System)
In the case of an adverse (favorable) labor market shock in country A, the resulting down-
ward (upward) shift of country B’s labor demand curve is stronger than the downward
(upward) shift of country B’s wage-setting curve.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
In the case of a two-tier system the following results with respect to unemployment and
real wages are obtained:
Proposition 4 (Results for Two-Tier Benefit System)
If a two-tier unemployment compensation system prevails in both countries, labor market
shocks in one country have an impact on real wages and unemployment in both countries.
An adverse labor market shock in country A leads to a higher unemployment rate and
higher real wages in that country. In the other country the unemployment rate also
increases, whereas real wages decline. A favorable labor market shock in country A has
the opposite effects: it leads to a decline in unemployment in both countries, reduces real
wages in country A and causes a rise in real wages in country B.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
Figure 1 may help to clarify these results. Note that the location of the labor demand
curve (LD-curve) and the wage-setting curve (WS-curve) depends on the unemployment
rate in the other country due to the aggregate income effect. In Figure 1(a) the initial
labor market equilibrium for country A is determined by the labor demand curve LD(uB0 )
and the wage-setting curve WS0(u
B
0 ) (point A). Now consider the consequences of an
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Figure 1: The Consequences of an Adverse Labor Market Shock in Country A if a Two-
Tier Benefit System Prevails in Both Countries
adverse labor market shock in country A, which might be provoked by a rise in labor
union power in that country. Since wAχA > 0, the rise in χA will shift the wage-setting
curve upwards to WS1(u
B
0 ). In a closed economy, the new equilibrium would be given by
point B, with national real wages and unemployment increasing as depicted. However, in
the open economy considered here, there are also reactions of firms and labor unions in
country B due to the decline of aggregate output (Figure 1(b)). A reduction in Y leads
to a decline in marginal revenue with respect to employment, which implies that labor
demand decreases. The decline in labor demand corresponds to the downward (rightward)
shift of the LD-curve.
A decline in Y also implies that the labor demand elasticity and the elasticity of
marginal revenue with respect to employment increase.10 As a consequence, the wage
markup on the expected alternative income declines for every labor union implying lower
wage pressure at the national level. This effect leads to a downward shift of the WS curve
in country B. According to Proposition 3, the aggregate income effect has a stronger
10This is evident in the proof of Lemma 5.
13
impact on the labor demand curve than on the wage-setting curve. As a consequence, the
unemployment rate in country B is rising and real wages are falling.
The increase in unemployment leads to a further reduction of aggregate output, im-
plying a feedback effect on country A. In Figure 1(a), this is depicted by a corresponding
downward shift of the WS and LD curve in country A, leading to a further increase of
the unemployment rate and a downward pressure on real wages. Despite the latter effect,
it is shown in the proof of Proposition 4 that in the new equilibrium given by point C
real wages in country A will be higher than before. It can be concluded that those still
employed in country A are profiting from real wage gains whereas the employees in coun-
try B are adversely affected in two ways: firstly, the real wage push in country A causes
unemployment in country B to rise and secondly, the remaining employees have to accept
lower real wages.
If the comparative-static results for the unemployment rates of both countries are
taken into account in the remaining equations of the model, the following results can
additionally be derived:
Corollary 1 If a two-tier unemployment compensation system prevails in both countries,
an adverse labor market shock in country A also has the following consequences: YA and
YB decline, YA/YB declines, Y declines, pA increases, pB declines and hence the real
exchange rate pA/pB increases. The reverse signs apply for a favorable labor market shock
in country A.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
In this model all goods produced in the two-country world are traded between countries.
Hence, pA/pB also denotes the price ratio of exported relative to imported goods. An
increase in pA/pB in the case of an adverse labor market shock means that country A
experiences a real appreciation. The change in relative prices shifts relative demand
towards country B. However, the favorable relative price effect does not prevent the
unemployment rate in country B from rising. The reason is that the (negative) aggregate
income effect is stronger than the relative price effect. At first glance one could suspect
that a high elasticity of substitution between goods might modify this result, since in this
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case a given change in relative prices would induce a strong relative demand shift in favor
of country B. However, this would also lead to a more pronounced rise in country A’s
unemployment rate, implying a larger reduction of aggregate output. Thus, the aggregate
income effect is dominant even if the demand for goods is highly elastic.
4.2 Earnings-Related Unemployment Compensation System
As a special case it is now assumed that a (pure) earnings-related benefit (ERB) system
exists in both countries, which implies that γj = 1 in eq. (2). As a consequence, b˜j = 0,
and unemployment compensation in each country simply is sj = ρjwj, for j = A,B. For
the comparative-static effects in country B the following result is important:
Proposition 5 (Aggregate Income Effect in ERB System)
In the case of an adverse (favorable) labor market shock in country A, the labor demand
and wage-setting curve in country B are shifting downwards (upwards) by the same
amount.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
This proposition immediately leads to
Proposition 6 (Results for ERB System)
If an earnings-related benefit system prevails in both countries, country-specific labor
market shocks only have an impact on real wages in the other country. An adverse
(favorable) labor market shock in country A leads to higher (lower) unemployment and
higher (lower) real wages in that country. In country B real wages decline (rise). In both
cases the unemployment rate in country B is not affected.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
These results are illustrated in Figure 2. In Figure 2(a) the initial labor market equilibrium
for country A is determined by the labor demand curve LD(uB0 ) and the wage-setting curve
WS0(u
B
0 ) (point A). Now consider again an increase in union power in country A, which
shifts the wage-setting curve to WS1(u
B
0 ). As a consequence, unemployment and real
wages are higher (point B). The rise in uA affects the labor demand and wage-setting
curve in country B, leading to a downward shift of both curves which is of equal size
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Figure 2: The Consequences of an Adverse Labor Market Shock in Country A if an
Earnings-Related Benefit System Prevails in Both Countries
in Figure 2(b). As a consequence, the new equilibrium is characterized by an unchanged
unemployment rate uB0 and lower real wages w
B
1 (point B). With u
B remaining unchanged,
there is no repercussion effect on country A. Corollary 1 must be slightly modified to
Corollary 2 If a pure earnings-related unemployment compensation system prevails in
both countries, an adverse labor market shock in country A also has the following conse-
quences: YA declines, whereas YB remains unchanged, leading to a decline in YA/YB and
Y . Moreover, pA increases, pB declines and hence the real exchange rate pA/pB increases.
The reverse signs apply for a favorable labor market shock in country A.
Proof. Since uB remains constant and the stock of capital is fixed, also YB is unaffected.
The marginal product of labor in countryB remains unchanged. With these modifications,
the proof is analogous to the proof of Corollary 1. ¤
The analysis in this subsection demonstrates that country B’s employment level is not
affected by labor market shocks stemming from abroad if a pure earnings-related bene-
fit system prevails in this country. The same “employment neutrality result” has been
obtained in Beissinger and Bu¨sse (2001) within a Cobb-Douglas model in which the wage-
setting curve in the pure ERB system turns out to be vertical. This result does therefore
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not depend on the wage-setting curve to be vertical. The economic intuition behind this
result rather lies in the fact that in an ERB system the impact on wages is amplified
because unemployment benefits move in the same direction as wages. In other words:
country B’s real wage response to labor market shocks stemming from abroad is flexible
enough to keep the level of employment unchanged.
4.3 Flat-Rate Unemployment Compensation System
In this section it is assumed that b˜j > 0 and ρ˜j = 0, for j = A,B, i.e. a pure flat-rate
benefit (FRB) system exists in both countries. It turns out that the analysis in this case
resembles the analysis of the two-tier unemployment compensation system.
Proposition 7 (Aggregate Income Effect in FRB System)
In the case of an adverse (favorable) labor market shock in country A, the resulting down-
ward (upward) shift of country B’s labor demand curve is stronger than the downward
(upward) shift of country B’s wage-setting curve.
Proof. See Appendix. ¤
Proposition 7 implies that the graphical analysis in the case of the two-tier unemployment
compensation system (Figure 1) can also be applied if a pure flat-rate benefit system
prevails in both countries, which means that the same qualitative results are obtained.
Proposition 8 (Results for FRB System)
If a pure flat-rate unemployment compensation system prevails in both countries, the
same qualitative results as stated in Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 are obtained.
Proof. Taking account of Proposition 7, the proof of Proposition 4 can also be applied to
the model with pure flat-rate unemployment benefits in both countries. Then the results
of Corollary 1 also follow. ¤
Although in a pure flat-rate unemployment compensation system the same qualitative
results as in a two-tier system are obtained, the quantitative implications are different.
This will be discussed in more detail in the following section.
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4.4 The Implications of Different Unemployment Compensation
Systems for Country B
The emphasis in this section will be placed on the consequences of different benefit systems
for country B. The analysis will be facilitated by the following proposition.
Proposition 9 (Comparison of Two-Tier and Flat-Rate Benefit System)
In a two-tier unemployment compensation system the wage-setting curve is steeper than
in a pure flat-rate benefit system. A given change in the unemployment rate abroad leads
to a stronger shift of the wage-setting curve if a two-tier system instead of a flat-rate
system prevails.
Proof. See Appendix ¤
Based on this proposition, interesting results for country B can be derived. We have
already demonstrated that an adverse labor market shock in country A does not affect
employment in country B if an earnings-related benefit system prevails in that country.
However, with a two-tier or a flat-rate benefit system, unemployment in country B in-
creases. It can be concluded that the increase in unemployment in the latter cases must
be attributed to the flat-rate component of unemployment benefits. It might therefore be
suspected that for a given unemployment compensation system in country A, the increase
in unemployment in country B is stronger in a pure flat-rate benefit system than in a
two-tier system.
This supposition is corroborated by Figure 3, which depicts the situation for coun-
try B in the case of both a two-tier and a flat-rate unemployment compensation system.
The wage-setting curves with solid (dashed) lines correspond to a two-tier (flat-rate) un-
employment compensation system. Due to Proposition 9 the WS curve in the two-tier
system is steeper than the WS curve which corresponds to the flat-rate system. For both
systems, the initial equilibrium is characterized by an unemployment rate uB0 and a real
wage wB0 . It is assumed that country A is hit by an adverse labor market shock. For
the following considerations the benefit system in country A is taken to be given, but
which type of benefit system prevails is not relevant. Due to the adverse labor market
18
6-
WS0
WS1 ?
?
?
wB
wB0
wB1
wB1
uB0 u
B
1 u
B
1
uB
LD0
LD1
WS0
WS1
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Notes: It is assumed that an adverse labor market shock occurs in country A. The wage-setting curves
with solid (dashed) lines result in a two-tier (flat-rate) unemployment compensation system.
shock, unemployment rises in country A.11 The increase in uA leads to a downward shift
of both labor demand and wage-setting curve in country B. It has already been shown
in Proposition 3 and Proposition 7 that the downward-shift of the wage-setting curve in
the two-tier as well as the flat-rate system is less pronounced than the shift of the labor
demand curve. Moreover, due to Proposition 9 the shift of the WS curve is stronger
than the shift of the WS curve. The new equilibrium in the two-tier system is given by
(uB1 , w
B
1 ), whereas in the flat-rate system (u
B
1 , w
B
1 ) results. Hence, it can be seen that, on
the one hand, the increase in unemployment in country B is stronger if a flat-rate benefit
system prevails. On the other hand, the decline in real wages is stronger if a two-tier
benefit system exists.
11Of course, it is clear from the analysis so far, that the extent of the unemployment increase also
depends on the unemployment compensation system in country A.
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In the same way the results for a favorable labor market shock in country A can
be derived. In this case the labor demand curve and wage-setting curve in country B
shift upwards. The increase in employment is then more pronounced in a pure flat-rate
benefit system than in a two-tier system. The results are summarized in the following
proposition, in which additionally the results for the earnings-related benefit system are
taken into account.
Proposition 10 (Results for Country B)
If an adverse (favorable) labor market shock occurs in country A, country B experiences
the greatest rise (decline) in unemployment in a flat-rate benefit system, a less pronounced
rise (decline) in unemployment in a two-tier system and no change in unemployment in an
earnings-related system. The strongest decline (rise) in real wages occurs in an earnings-
related benefit system and the lowest decline (rise) in a flat-rate system. In a two-tier
benefit system the real wage response lies in between these two cases.
Proof. The results for the flat-rate system and the two-tier system are evident from Fig-
ure 3. In an earnings-related benefit system the shift in the wage-setting curve is equal
to the shift of the labor demand curve. Hence, the change in real wages corresponds to
the vertical shift of the labor demand curve. ¤
According to Proposition 10 the real wage flexibility is the lower the higher the share of
flat-rate benefits, implying stronger employment effects of international shock spillovers.
5 Summary and Conclusions
Based on a two-country model with monopolistic competition in goods markets and wage
bargaining in labor markets it is scrutinized how the unemployment compensation system
affects the consequences of international shock spillovers on real wages and unemployment.
The shocks considered are country-specific changes in the level of unemployment benefits,
changes in labor unions’ bargaining power or changes in union preferences. The trans-
mission of these idiosyncratic labor market shocks to other countries is brought about via
changes in world real income. The paper provides new insights on how changes in world
real income influence labor demand and the wage bargaining process.
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Focusing on the main results of the paper, it is shown that an increase (decline)
in the unemployment rate in one country shifts the labor demand curve and the wage-
setting curve in the other country downwards (upwards). The extent of the shift of the
wage-setting curve in comparison to the shift of the labor demand curve depends on the
unemployment compensation system. If benefits are earnings-related, both labor demand
and wage-setting curve are shifting to the same extent. In this case labor market shocks
stemming from abroad only affect real wages but leave unemployment unchanged. If
instead a two-tier or a flat-rate benefit system prevails, shock spillovers from abroad lead
to a more pronounced shift of the labor demand curve relative to the wage-setting curve.
This implies that not only real wages but also unemployment is affected by labor market
shocks originating abroad. We also compare the relative strength of the effects in two-tier
and pure flat-rate systems. It is shown that in a two-tier benefit system the wage-setting
curve is steeper than in a pure flat-rate system. Moreover, shock spillovers lead to a
stronger shift of the wage-setting curve if a two-tier instead of a flat-rate system prevails.
If these results are taken together, the following conclusion can be drawn: If an ad-
verse (favorable) labor market shock occurs in country A, country B experiences the
greatest rise (decline) in unemployment in a flat-rate benefit system, a less pronounced
rise (decline) in unemployment in a two-tier system and no change in unemployment
in an earnings-related system. The strongest decline (rise) in real wages occurs in an
earnings-related benefit system and the lowest decline (rise) in a flat-rate system. In
a two-tier benefit system the real wage response lies in between these two cases. As a
consequence, if a government wants to prevent employment fluctuations caused by inter-
national spillover effects, it should choose a pure earnings-related instead of a two-tier or
flat-rate unemployment compensation system.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Facing the budget constraint
∑
j=A,B
∑G/2
i=1 PijY
nh
ij = I
nh, con-
sumer n in country h maximizes utility Unh = G1/(1−η)(
∑
j=A,B
∑G/2
i=1 (Y
nh
ij )
κ)(1/κ) with
respect to Y nhij , where κ ≡ (η − 1)/η, n = 1 . . . L and h = A,B.12 For an employed
(unemployed) consumer income Inh comprises his share of profits and wage income (un-
employment benefits). The goods demand functions of the single consumer are Y nhij =
(Pij/P )
−η Inh/(PG), where P ≡ ( 1
G
∑
j=A,B
∑G/2
i=1 P
1−η
ij )
1/(1−η) denotes the aggregate price
index. The demand function Y dij for the producer of good i in country j is Y
d
ij =
(Pij/P )
−η (1/G)(
∑
h=A,B
∑L
n=1 I
nh/P ). World real income in terms of the aggregate good
is Y ≡∑h=A,B∑Ln=1 (Inh/P ). This leads to Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. Production is equal to demand, i.e. Y dij = Yij. Due to Lemma 1
the inverse goods demand function is pij = Y
κ−1
ij (Y/G)
1−κ, where pij denotes the firm’s
relative price (in terms of the aggregate good), i.e. pij ≡ Pij/P , and 0 < κ < 1. The
revenue function of each firm (in terms of the aggregate good) can be written as Rij =
Rij(Nij, Y ) = pijYij = [aN
β
ij + (1 − a)Kβij]κ/β (Y/G)1−κ, where Kij and G are suppressed
as arguments of the revenue function. Marginal revenue with respect to employment is
RijNij = κ ε
YN
ij
Y κij
Nij
(
Y
G
)1−κ
> 0, with εYNij = ε
YN
ij (Nij) = a
(
Nij
Yij
)β
. (A.1)
εYNij is the elasticity of output with respect to employment, with 0 < ε
YN
ij < 1. Further-
more, RijNij ,Y = (1−κ)Y −1RijNij > 0, and RijNij ,Nij = N−1ij
[
(κ− β)εYNij − (1− β)
]
RijNij < 0,
where the negative sign in the latter derivative results because (κ− β)εYNij < 1− β for all
permissible values of β, κ and εYNij . The concavity of the revenue function with respect to
employment guarantees that the optimal employment level is found by the first-order con-
dition RijNij − wij = 0. This equation implicitly determines Nij as a function N ij(wij, Y )
with N ijwij = 1/R
ij
Nij ,Nij
< 0 and N ijY = −RijNij ,Y /RijNij ,Nij > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3. As a first step one has to insert eq. (A.1) in the first-order condition
RijNij − wij = 0. Since Nj = (G/2)Nij, Kj = (G/2)Kij and Nj = (1 − uj)L, the inverse
labor demand function of country j = A,B is
wj = n
j(uj, Y ) ≡ κ a [(1− uj)L]β−1
[
a[(1− uj)L]β + (1− a)Kβj
]κ−β
β
(
Y
2
)1−κ
, (A.2)
12The derivation of the firm’s goods demand function under monopolistic competition in the goods
market follows a standard approach in the macroeconomics literature. See, for instance, Weitzman
(1985), Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), and Dutt and Sen (1997).
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with the partial derivatives njuj = (wj/(1 − uj))
[
(1− β)− (κ− β)εYNj
]
> 0 and njY =
(1 − κ)(wj/Y ) > 0, where εYNj = εYNj (Nj) ≡ a(Nj/Yj)β and j = A,B. njuj > 0 since the
expression in brackets is positive for all permissible values of β and κ.
Proof of Lemma 4. The bargained real wage is found by maximizing the Nash product
max
wij
{
N
φj
ij [wij − zj]
}χj {
Rij(Nij, Y )− wijNij
}1−χj , s.t. Nij = N ij(wij, Y ), (A.3)
for i = 1, . . . , G/2 and j = A,B. The first-order condition is
1
wij
{
χj
wij
wij − zj + χjφjN
ij
wij
(·) wij
N ij(·) − (1− χj)
wijN
ij(·)
Rij(·)− wijN ij(·)
}
= 0. (A.4)
It has to be noted that
wijN
ij(·)
Rij(·)− wijN ij(·) =
RijNij(·)N ij(·)/Rij(·)
1−RijNij(·)N ij(·)/Rij(·)
=
κεYNij (N
ij(wij, Y ))
1− κεYNij (N ij(wij, Y ))
(A.5)
is the elasticity of profits with respect to the real wage. The last expression in eq. (A.5)
follows from inserting the terms for Rij and RijNij derived in the Proof of Lemma 2. Taking
account of eq. (A.5) when solving for wij in eq. (A.4) leads to Lemma 4. The second-order
condition for a maximum of the Nash product requires that
χj
∂[wij/(wij − zj)]
∂wij
− χjφj
∂εNWij
∂Nij
∂N ij
∂wij
− (1− χj)
∂[κεYNij /(1− κεYNij )]
∂Nij
∂N ij
∂wij
(A.6)
is negative. The first term in this expression is negative. Furthermore,
εNWij =
1
(1− β)− (κ− β) εYNij (Nij)
and
∂εNWij
∂Nij
=
(κ− β)
[(1− β − (κ− β)εYNij )]2
∂εYNij
∂Nij
. (A.7)
It is assumed that σ < 1 which implies β < 0. As a consequence, sign
(
∂εNWij /∂Nij
)
=
sign
(
∂εYNij /∂Nij
)
. Since εYNij = aN
β
ij[aN
β
ij + (1− a)Kβij]−1,
∂εYNij
∂Nij
= β
εYNij (1− εYNij )
Nij
< 0 if β < 0. (A.8)
Furthermore, note that
∂[κεYNij /(1− κεYNij )]
∂Nij
=
κ
(1− κεYNij )2
∂εYNij
∂Nij
. (A.9)
One must also bear in mind that due to Lemma 2, N ijwij < 0. It follows that all terms
in eq. (A.6) are negative. As a result, the second-order condition for a maximum of the
Nash product is fulfilled if it is assumed that the elasticity of substitution between labor
and capital is less than one.
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Proof of Lemma 5. It holds that mijµij < 0, i.e. mij and µij are negatively related. It
is easily computed that µijφj > 0 and µ
ij
χj
< 0. One also obtains
µijΩ =
[
φj
∂εNWij
∂Nij
+
1− χj
χj
κ
(1− κεYNij )2
∂εYNij
∂Nij
]
N ijΩ , where Ω ∈ {wij, Y }. (A.10)
N ijwij < 0 and N
ij
Y > 0 due to Lemma 2. If σ < 1 and therefore β < 0, it also holds
that ∂εYNij /∂Nij < 0 due to eq. (A.8) and ∂ε
NW
ij /∂Nij < 0 due to eq. (A.7). As a result,
µijwij > 0 and µ
ij
Y < 0.
Proof of Lemma 6. Taking account of Lemma 4, eqs. (1) and (2), and bearing in mind
that in equilibrium wij = wj and µ
ij = µj, one obtains
F(wj, uj, Y, φj, χj, ρ˜j, b˜j) = 0, F(·) ≡ wj{(1− ρ˜j)− [µj(wj, Y, φj, χj)θj(uj)]−1} − b˜j.
(A.11)
If b˜j > 0 (b˜j = 0), the term in brackets must be positive (zero) in order to guarantee
that wj > 0. Hence, it must hold that (1 − ρ˜j)µj (wj, Y, φj, χj) θj(uj) ≥ 1. Eq. (A.11)
implicitly defines wj as a function of the other variables if ∂F(·)/∂wj 6= 0. This is the
case for ρ˜j > 0 and b˜j ≥ 0 as well as for ρ˜j = 0 and b˜j > 0. One obtains
wjuj = −wjµjθjujΨ−1j < 0, wjY = −wjθjµjYΨ−1j > 0, wjρ˜j = wj(µjθj)2Ψ−1j > 0
wjφj = −wjθjµjφjΨ−1j < 0, wjχj = −wjθjµjχjΨ−1j > 0, wjb˜j = (µ
jθj)2Ψ−1j > 0, (A.12)
where Ψj ≡ µjθj [(1− ρ˜j)µjθj − 1] + wj θj µjwj > 0.
Proof of Lemma 7. Since national prices pj (in terms of the aggregate good) may
differ, aggregate output has to be written as Y = pAYA + pBYB. Inserting the inverse
goods demand function of each country and the national version of the CES production
function into this equation and bearing in mind that Nj = (1− uj)L, one obtains:
Y = y(uA, uB) ≡ 2
κ−1
κ
( ∑
j=A,B
[
a ((1− uj)L)β + (1− a)Kβj
]κ
β
) 1
κ
(A.13)
with yuj = − (Y/2)1−κ (Y κj εYNj )/(1− uj) < 0, j = A,B.
Proof of Proposition 1. According to Lemmas 3 and 7 it holds that njuj > 0, n
j
Y > 0,
and yuj < 0 for j = A,B. Hence, (∂wj/∂uk)|LDj = njY yuk < 0, j 6= k and j, k = A,B.
However, the sign of (∂wj/∂uj)|LDj is not immediately obvious. It holds that
∂wj
∂uj
∣∣∣∣
LDj
= njuj + n
j
Y yuj =
wj
1− uj
[
(1− β)− (κ− β)εYNj − (1− κ)εYNj 2κ−1
(
Yj
Y
)κ]
> 0.
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The positive sign arises because (1− β) > (κ− β)εYNj + (1− κ)εYNj , where the right-hand
side of this inequality is equal to (1 − β)εYNj , and 0 < εYNj < 1. Furthermore, 2κ−1 < 1
and (Yj/Y )
κ < 1.
Proof of Proposition 2. According to Lemmas 6 and 7 it holds that wjuj < 0, w
j
Y > 0,
and yuj < 0 for j = A,B. Hence, (∂wj/∂uk)|WSj = wjY yuk < 0, j 6= k and j, k = A,B.
Moreover, (∂wj/∂uj)|WSj = wjuj + wjY yuj < 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. For Proposition 3 to be true it must hold that |nBY yuA| >
|wBY yuA|, implying wBY − nBY < 0. Based on the expression for wjY in eq. (A.12), it can be
computed that
wjY = −
wjθ
jµjY
Ψj
= − µ
j
Y /µ
j
wj{
µj [(1− ρ˜j)µjθj − 1] /
(
wjµ
j
wj
)}
+ 1
. (A.14)
Taking account of eq. (A.10), it follows that µjY /µ
j
w = N
j
Y /N
j
wj
. Since Nj = (1 − uj)L,
eq. (A.2) implicitly defines the labor demand function N j(wj, Y ). Applying the implicit
function rule leads to
∂N j/∂Y
∂N j/∂wj
= −κ(1− κ)aNβ−1j [aNβj + (1− a)Kβj ]
κ−β
β
(
Y
2
)−κ
1
2
= −(1− κ)wj
Y
= −njY ,
(A.15)
where the last equality follows from the proof of Lemma 3. Hence,
wjY =
njY{
µj [(1− ρ˜j)µjθj − 1] /
(
wjµ
j
wj
)}
+ 1
. (A.16)
As stated in the proof of Lemma 6, (1 − ρ˜j)µjθj ≥ 1. As a result, the denominator in
eq. (A.16) is greater than one, which leads to wjY − njY < 0, for j = A,B.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using the notation of Assumption 4, in country A the vari-
able xA changes, where xA ∈ XA = {φA, χA, ρ˜A, b˜A}. Bearing in mind eq. (3), the following
equation system must be solved:
J
(
∂uA/∂xA
∂uB/∂xA
)
=
(
wAxA
0
)
, (A.17)
where the Jacobi matrix J is defined as
J ≡
(
(nAuA + n
A
Y yuA)− (wAuA + wAY yuA) (nAY − wAY )yuB
(nBY − wBY )yuA (nBuB + nBY yuB)− (wBuB + wBY yuB)
)
. (A.18)
25
Step 1: Determination of the sign of |J|. One obtains
|J| = [−(nAuA + nAY yuA)wBuB − (nBuB + nBY yuB)wAuA + (wAuA + wAY yuA)wBuB
+wBY yuB(w
A
uA
− nAuA)− nBuBwAY yuA
]
+ nBuB(n
A
uA
+ nAY yuA) + n
A
uA
nBY yuB . (A.19)
Recalling the signs of the derivatives from Lemma 3, Lemma 6, Lemma 7, Proposi-
tion 1 and Proposition 2, it becomes clear that all terms in brackets are positive. Hence,
nBuB(n
A
uA
+ nAY yuA) + n
A
uA
nBY yuB > 0 is a sufficient condition for |J| > 0. Using the expres-
sions for njuj and n
j
Y from Lemma 3 and yuj from Lemma 7, one obtains
nBuB(n
A
uA
+ nAY yuA) + n
A
uA
nBY yuB = n
A
uA
nBuB
[
1 +
nAY yuA
nAuA
+
nBY yuB
nBuB
]
= nAuAn
B
uB
[
1− 2κ−1
(
ΛA
(
YA
Y
)κ
+ ΛB
(
YB
Y
)κ)]
, (A.20)
where
Λj ≡
(1− κ)εYNj
(1− β)− (κ− β)εYNj
j = A,B. (A.21)
Due to the proof of Proposition 1 it holds that (1−β)− (κ−β)εYNj > (1−κ)εYNj . Hence,
Λj < 1. From Lemma 7 it is easily derived that Y
κ = 2κ−1 (Y κA + Y
κ
B ). Therefore
2κ−1
[
ΛA
(
YA
Y
)κ
+ ΛB
(
YB
Y
)κ]
< 1. (A.22)
This implies nBuB(n
A
uA
+ nAY yuA) + n
A
uA
nBY yuB > 0. As a result, |J| > 0.
Step 2: Solution of the system in eq. (A.17). One obtains
∂uA
∂xA
=
1
|J|w
A
xA
[
(nBuB + n
B
Y yuB)− (wBuB + wBY yuB)
]
. (A.23)
From Propositions 1 and 2 it follows that the expression in brackets is positive. Hence,
sign (∂uA/∂xA) = sign(w
A
xA
). It also holds that
∂uB
∂xA
=
1
|J|w
A
xA
(wBY − nBY )yuA , (A.24)
where yuA < 0 due to Lemma 7. Bearing in mind Proposition 3, it holds that w
B
Y −nBY < 0.
Hence, sign (∂uB/∂xA) = sign(w
A
xA
). The comparative-static effects on real wages can be
determined by considering the labor demand equations. One obtains for country A:
∂wA
∂xA
= (nAuA + n
A
Y yuA)
∂uA
∂xA
+ nAY yuB
∂uB
∂xA
. (A.25)
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Due to Proposition 1, nAuA+n
A
Y yuA > 0. Furthermore, n
A
Y > 0 and yuB < 0 due to Lemma 3
and Lemma 7, respectively. According to the results above, ∂uA/∂xA and ∂uB/∂xA have
the same sign. The sign of ∂wA/∂xA therefore is not immediately obvious. Taking account
of the solutions for the change in unemployment leads to:
∂wA
∂xA
=
wAxA
|J|
{
nBuB(n
A
uA
+ nAY yuA) + n
A
uA
nBY yuB − wBuB(nAuA + nAY yuA)− nAuAwBY yuB
}
.
It has been shown above in Step 1 that nBuB(n
A
uA
+ nAY yuA) + n
A
uA
nBY yuB > 0. From
Lemma 6 follows wBuB < 0 and w
B
Y > 0. n
A
uA
> 0 and yuB < 0 hold due to Lemma 3
and Lemma 7, respectively. Therefore, sign (∂wA/∂xA) = sign
(
wAxA
)
. The change in real
wages in country B is given by
∂wB
∂xA
= (nBuB + n
B
Y yuB)
∂uB
∂xA
+ nBY yuA
∂uA
∂xA
=
wAxA
|J| (n
B
uB
wBY − nBYwBuB)yuA .
From the signs of the partial derivatives in Lemma 3 and Lemma 6 it immediately follows
that nBuBw
B
Y − nBYwBuB > 0. Since yuA < 0, sign (∂wB/∂xA) = − sign
(
wAx
)
. The respective
sign of wAxA can be taken from Lemma 6. Then Proposition 4 follows.
Proof of Corollary 1. i) Consider the case of an adverse labor market shock in coun-
try A. Due to Proposition 4, uA and uB increase. Since the stock of capital is fixed, it
immediately follows that YA, YB and hence also Y decline. For the impact on relative
prices, consider the first-order condition for firm’s labor demand in the proof of Lemma 2,
which can be written as κ pij
∂Yij
∂Nij
= wij. An adverse labor market shock in country A
leads to a decline in employment in country B, which implies an increase in the marginal
product of labor. Since wiB declines for all i, it can be concluded that piB and hence
pB must have decreased. Moreover, pA must have increased since it is not possible that
in both countries prices decline relative to the aggregate price level. From the national
goods demand functions follows that YA/YB = (pB/pA)
1
1−κ , where 1/(1− κ) = η denotes
the elasticity of substitution between goods. Since pB/pA declines, it follows that YA/YB
declines. As a result, YA declines by more than YB. ii) For a positive labor market shock
the same reasoning applies, but the signs have to be reversed, i.e. uA and uB decline, YA
and YB increase, pA decreases, pB increases, pA/pB declines, and YA/YB increases, which
implies that YA increases by more than YB.
Proof of Proposition 5. According to the Proposition it must hold that |nBY yuA| =
|wBY yuA|, implying wBY − nBY = 0 if b˜j = 0. From the wage-setting equation in the
proof of Lemma 6 it is evident that with b˜j = 0 and ρ˜j = ρj one obtains (1 − ρj) −
[µj (wj, Y, φj, χj) θ
j(uj)]
−1 = 0. Hence, (1 − ρj)µjθj = 1. It then follows from eq. (A.14)
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that wjY = −µjY /µjwj = njY , where the last equality follows from the proof of Proposition 3.
As a result, wjY − njY = 0, for j = A,B.
Proof of Proposition 6. Bearing Proposition 5 in mind, it follows from eq. (A.24)
that ∂uB/∂xA = 0. Due to eq. (A.23) it also follows that ∂uA/∂xA = |J|−1wAx (nBuB −
wBuB). Since n
B
uB
> 0 and wBuB < 0, sign (∂uA/∂xA) = sign
(
wAxA
)
. Eq. (A.25) becomes
∂wA/∂xA = (n
A
uA
+ nAY yuA)(∂uA/∂xA). Due to Proposition 1, (n
A
uA
+ nAY yuA) > 0. As a
result, sign (∂wA/∂xA) = sign
(
wAxA
)
. Furthermore, ∂wB/∂xA = n
B
Y yuA(∂uA/∂xA), where
nBY yuA < 0 because of Lemma 3 and Lemma 7. Hence, sign (∂wB/∂xA) = − sign
(
wAxA
)
.
Proof of Proposition 7. It has to be shown that |nBY yuA| > |wBY yuA|, implying wBY −
nBY < 0. Since ρ˜j = 0, the expression Ψj defined in the proof of Lemma 6 simplifies to
Ψ˜j ≡ µjθj (µjθj − 1) + wj θj µjwj > 0. It then follows from eq. (A.12) that
wjY = −
wjθ
jµjY
Ψ˜j
= − µ
j
Y /µ
j
wj{
µj (µjθj − 1) / (wjµjwj)}+ 1 . (A.26)
Along the lines of the proof of Proposition 3, it is easily seen that wjY can be written as
wjY = n
j
Y /{[µj(µjθj − 1)/(wjµjwj)] + 1}. Since the denominator is greater than one, it
follows that wjY − njY < 0.
Proof of Proposition 9. According to Proposition 2, the slope of the wage-setting
curve is wjuj +w
j
Y yuj . Shifts of the wage-setting curve due to the aggregate income effect
are given as wjY yuk for j, k = A,B and j 6= k. The expression Ψj, defined in the proof
of Lemma 6, is smaller than the expression Ψ˜j, which has been defined in the proof of
Proposition 7. Hence, if Ψj in Lemma 6 is replaced by Ψ˜j, it is immediately evident that∣∣wjuj |FRB∣∣ < ∣∣wjuj |two-tier∣∣ and wjY |FRB < wjY |two-tier. From this the Proposition follows.
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